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HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
Catalyzing Fans
Dan Markel,Z" L* Michael McCann,** and Howard M. Wasserman***
For which team should basketball superstar LeBron James play? Where
should celebrity statistician Nate Silver ply his craft of predictive wizardry?
On which network should Jon Stewart flash his mordant wit? For some
reason, the answers to these disparate questions are only indirectly related to
the desires of third-party fans. Indeed, it is a puzzle that fans do not already
have more influence on the recruitment or retention of their sports or en-
tertainment heroes ("talent").
This paper proposes that fans can adopt forms of crowdfunding to mo-
bilize and empower fans to play a larger role in the decision-making associ-
ated with which "teams" the talent will work. By creating Fan Action
Committees ("FACs"), fans could directly compensate talent or donate to
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charities favored by talent. We discuss both obstacles and objections from a
variety of policy and legal perspectives ranging from competitive balance to
distributive justice. Finally, we consider possible extensions of the FAC
model as well as offer some ruminations on why FACs have not already
developed.
Importantly, FACs create the potential for more efficient valuations of
talent by registering not only the number of fans but also the intensity of
their preferences. This insight, which stresses the upside of price discrimina-
tion, has relevance for a wide range of human endeavors where bilateral con-
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INTRODUCTION
Disappointment is endemic to fandom. Clevelanders were stung that
basketball hero LeBron James took his talents to South Beach, when he
signed with the Miami Heat in 2010,2 while Miami fans were equally disap-
pointed when James returned to Cleveland in 2014. 3 Many fans of TV's
"Downton Abbey" were crushed when actor Dan Stevens (the actor who
played male romantic lead Matthew Crawley) left the show in 2013.' Stu-
dents, faculty, and alumni at the University of Chicago are undoubtedly still
upset about losing one of the most prolific scholars, Cass Sunstein,5 to
Harvard Law School a few years ago.
The choices of where high-profile talent "perform" in an organiza-
tional context-athletes, academics, chefs, network newscasters, actors, op-
era singers, faculty members-present a puzzle. On the one hand,
"teams"-the organizations that employ talent-try to anticipate the pref-
erences of fans to capture their dollars. On the other hand, fans are largely
1 See Daniel L. Wann et al., Sports Fans: The Psychology and Social Impact of
Spectators (2001).
2 Michael Lee, LeBron james will Leave Cleveland Cavaliers to Join Dwayne Wade,
Chris Bosh with the Miami Heat, WASH. POST (July 9, 2010), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/08/AR2010070806865.html.
3 LeBron James (as told to Lee Jenkins), I'm Coming Home, SI.coM, (July 11,
2014), http://www.si.com/nba/2014/07/11 /lebron-james-cleveland-cavaliers.
4 See Leslie Messer, Dan Stevens Says His Exit from Downton Abbey Was An Emo-
tional Experience, ABC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/
dan-stevens -calls -watching -downton-abbey-emotional -experience/
story?id= 21578846.
5 Paul H. Edelman & Tracy E. George, Six Degrees of Cass Sunstein, 11 GREEN
BAG 2D 19 (2007).
6 We say teams because our paradigm for this paper will be contract negotiations
between an individual athlete and a professional sports team. But for purposes of the
larger idea, the team represents the second party in the bilateral negotiation that
controls where talent performs and under what conditions. So the team might be a
television network, a law school, a restaurant, a couture house, a symphony, etc.
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shut out of the conversations between talent and team. We wonder why fans
are not more proximately involved in talent's choices. Even if disappoint-
ment for fans is inevitable, utter powerlessness is not-or so we argue here.
Instead, fans can overcome that powerlessness through crowdfunding.
Crowdfunding empowers fans to collect and use money to influence the
choices talent makes regarding where to perform or for what team. As we see
it, groups of fans, what we call Fan Action Committees ("FACs"), would
engage in coordinated influence mongering, raising and offering money in
an effort to collectively affect the key choices made by stars or teams regard-
ing recruitment and retention. FACs, in short, allow fans to put their money
where their hearts are. A fancier way of saying this is that FACs can respond
to and reflect the intensity of third-party preferences affected by bilateral
contracts. Additionally, FACs will be particularly valuable when opportuni-
ties for price discrimination, which occurs when suppliers are able to charge
different prices to different consumers for the same product, are unavailable
or under-utilized under existing market conditions.8
This Article unfolds over three parts. Part I discusses the basic struc-
ture of FACs and how they differ from traditional crowdfunding projects.
Under the conventional crowdfunding model, there is a bilateral arrange-
ment between an artist or entrepreneur and the patron. To use a recent
example, there was a bilateral relationship between Hollywood producer
Rob Thomas and the Marshmallows, a.k.a. the fans of Veronica Mars, in
Thomas's efforts to use Kickstarter crowdfunding to make a Veronica Mars
movie. Our innovation is to extend the crowdfunding mechanism from bi-
lateral relationships to trilateral contexts, where members of a bilateral rela-
tionship can be influenced by third parties-fans-with an interest in that
relationship's texture or existence. We offer two approaches to designing
FACs. One is direct compensation, in which fan money goes directly to the
talent as supplemental income, comparable to endorsement deals. The other
is charitable contributions, in which fan money goes to some charitable
cause favored by the star.
' Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457,
1459 (2013).
" Price discrimination was historically regarded with suspicion as evidence of a
firm's monopolistic ambitions and capacities. In more recent decades, however, it
has been understood also as a vehicle for consumer welfare inasmuch as it can in-
crease efficiency and consumer surplus when it allows for competition among sellers
at various stages of a product's life-cycle. See generally Joel B. Dirlam & Alfred E.
Kahn, Price Discrimination in Law and Economics, 11 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 281
(1952); Louis PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION (1981).
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Part II considers a number of obstacles and objections to FACs under
either structure. For reasons discussed below, we focus our discussion prima-
rily on the professional sports context. In our view, sports leagues in particu-
lar may oppose FACs because they risk jeopardizing competitive balance
across teams. More generally, however, FACs might be challenged as either
pernicious (because they facilitate the rich getting richer) or futile (because
of suspicions that they will get little done). We engage these and other
challenges and explain how to surmount them. Part II also explains our
reasons for preferring the charitable FAC model.
Finally, in Part III, we offer some big picture thoughts. First, we con-
sider some of the incentives that might help make FACs more likely to
occur. For the most part, we think that FACs could make markets for talent
across a range of activities more efficient; in doing so, they can re-shape
many areas in which bilateral contracts generate externalities to third parties
who wish to promote or avoid those externalities. Second, we consider why,
if FACs can create gains from voluntary transactions, we do not see them
more often. Accordingly, we consider some of the transaction costs and so-
cial norms that are relevant to the discussion.
Two caveats should be issued before we proceed. First, as mentioned
above, we focus our efforts on the domain of professional team sports. We do
so because FACs in this domain would probably draw the most fan involve-
ment, raise the most money, and have the greatest effect on talent choices.
Professional team sports involve the paradigmatic trilateral relationship
among an organization (such as a sports franchise), talent, and passionate,
emotionally invested fans. Moreover, because of competitive balance con-
cerns distinctively arising in professional team sports, that domain may pre-
sent the most difficulty for FACs. Accordingly, we think that FACs have
tremendous promise in the realm of professional team sports, but also some
peril. That said, the institutional structures we envision are relevant for fans
of virtually any form of coordinated activity where contractual arrangements
generate substantial third party benefits-or harms.
Second, this is an "idea" paper, one meant to spur further conversation
without attempting to provide the final word on the matter. As such, the
recommendations and comments we make are somewhat tentative and yet,
we hope, somewhat tantalizing too.
Harvard Journal of Sports & Entertainment Law / Vol. 6
I. FAN ACTION COMMITTEES: AN OVERVIEW
A. Crowdfunding in Bilateral Relationships
Fans organizing into groups is nothing new. In the realm of sports, for
example, fans unite by attending games (and pregame tailgates) or by
watching and discussing them together at home, in bars, or in online fo-
rums. Many teams have official or unofficial fan clubs, some of which even
outlast the team itself.9 Outside of sports, celebrity websites and fan clubs
are ubiquitous, for everyone from chefs to actors. Fan networks preceded the
Internet, but their presence has only exploded with the rise of social media.
Websites allow fans to revel in their shared love of the team, personally
experience the team's success and failure, and express devotion and frustra-
tion alike. 0 Whether for Lady Gaga or the Chicago Bulls, fans express their
enthusiasm or disdain by buying tickets and licensed t-shirts-or not.
Crowdfunding provides another vehicle through which fans can mone-
tize that support and affection. This is already true for fans of emerging or
struggling artists or entrepreneurs without ready access to capital. In a typi-
cal crowdfunding arrangement, fans use online websites such as Kickstarter
and Indiegogo to pledge money to support an author or musician in some
endeavor. In perhaps the most famous and successful example to date, more
than 91,000 fans pledged more than $5 million to help produce a Veronica
Mars movie. 1 Crowdfunding is ripe for even more growth following revi-
sions to federal securities laws allowing shares in start-up companies to be
offered through crowdfunding mechanisms. 2 In short, crowdfunding ar-
rangements already exist, are effective at filling market demand, and, be-
cause of the ways in which the Kickstarter-type intermediaries serve as
trustworthy escrow agents, are essentially risk-free for contributors. They
need not worry that FACs or the funded talent will simply abscond with the
money. 3
9 BARRY LEVINSON, THE BAND THAT WOULDN'T DIE (ESPN Films, 30-for-30,
2009) (telling story of Baltimore Colts Marching Band, which continued to perform
in the decade after the Colts left Baltimore).
10 Howard M. Wasserman, Fans, Free Expression, and the Wide World of Sports, 67
U. PITT. L. REV. 525, 555 (2006).
" VERONICA MARS (Rob Thomas Productions 2014); Jason Cohen, Reviving an Old
Series the New Way: Fan-Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/04/28/us/veronica-mars -will-return- thanks -to-fan-financing.html.
12 Schwartz, supra note 7 at 1458-59; see also Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301-05 (codified in 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
13 Cf Brandon Gurney, From Chicago to Provo? BYU Fans Plan T-shirt Campaign
for Jabari Parker, DESERET NEWS, (Nov. 2, 2012, 2:44 PM), http://www.deser-
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B. The FACs Innovation: Crowdfunding Trilateral Relationships
Two things are notable about the typical crowdfunding situation. First,
it is largely bilateral between funders and funded. Fans give money directly
to the artist so the artist can perform her skill (writing the book, producing
the CD, producing the movie, etc.) or so the entrepreneur can establish her
company. Second, and relatedly, crowdfunding is frequently essential for the
completion of these projects. Without fan contributions, the artist will usu-
ally be unable to complete her project or otherwise perform her art.
FACs extend the crowdfunding model from the conventional bilateral
arrangement to a trilateral relationship involving a team, its fans, and a star
talent. Using the same crowdfunding processes and mechanisms, fans can
pledge, collect, and offer money to or for the benefit of that talent in ex-
change for him joining or remaining with "their" preferred team. Through
collective effort, or even the effort of just one wealthy fan with an interest in
the outcome, fans take an active and empowering role in recruiting and
retaining talent.
Several features define the trilateral relationships at the heart of FAC
activity. First, the primary relationship is between the team and the star.
The team pays the star a (usually substantial) salary and the star performs
even without FAC involvement. FAC-raised funds are not necessary for stars
to ply their trade, but rather act as a supplement to the primary relation-
ship. Second, fans' strongest loyalty is primarily (if not exclusively) to the
team; fans want the talent to join their team only so their team can win.
Fans may previously not have cared about the player or even actively rooted
against him on his old team, but quickly change allegiance once the player
has changed affiliations. 4 (This will not be the case in other domains.).
Third, the talent and team control the conversation; if the team is not inter-
ested in signing or keeping the player, or if the player is utterly uninterested
in playing for the team, the fans remain powerless. In most cases, FACs
cannot overcome recalcitrant management or its refusal to recognize the
value and benefit of signing the fans' preferred player because the team typi-
cally must be the first mover. 5 Finally, we expect FACs to be nonetheless
etnews.com/article/865565918/From-Chicago-to-Provo-BYU-fans-plan-T-shirt-
campaign-for-Jabari -Parker.html (noting concerns of fans who raised money for t-
shirts to be used in recruiting college basketball players to BYU).
14 As comedian Jerry Seinfeld put it, "you're actually rooting for the clothes
when you get right down to it." Seinfeld: The Label Maker (NBC television broadcast
Jan. 19, 1995).
15 It is possible that FAC efforts might help change the choices of team managers
or players. Perhaps the FAC's efforts convince a star to sign with an organization he
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particularly effective in a sport such as basketball, which involves fewer
players and in which one or two superstar players can make a team a cham-
pion. Fans thus can focus their crowdfunding efforts on those two stars, with
some confidence that their presence will bring team success.
When FACs perform their intended function, fans no longer act as
passive and inconsequential consumers. Rather, FACs provide, if not a seat
at the bargaining table, a powerful and potentially influential voice in the
process of recruiting or retaining talent by helping to create the most ap-
pealing offer and atmosphere and to convince the talent to come to (or stay
in) their team's city. They do so by arranging a transaction directly with, or
for the benefit of, the talent, rather than with the team. That this new voice
may put teams in a difficult spot at times is precisely the point of allowing
fans to develop this powerful, perhaps contrary, voice that actually may in-
fluence or change the behavior and preferences of teams and players. 16
A FAC need not assume any particular form. It could be established
either as a distinct organization or as an offshoot of an existing larger (unof-
ficial) fan club. The FAC itself could be a formal legal organization or it
could be one person or a group of individuals joined by physical or virtual
space, reaching out and encouraging fundraising efforts among the fan base.
It can utilize existing crowdfunding platforms and mechanisms, and the
efficiency and security they provide, with fans pledging contingent funds,
paid only if the recruitment effort succeeds. The FAC serves as advocate and
accountant-publicizing recruitment and funding efforts, urging fans to
contribute funds, tracking funds raised, and announcing the amounts
pledged as part of media efforts to recruit talent. As with other mechanisms
that channel money and influence, FACs likely would evolve over time, be-
coming more responsive, effective, and adaptable to changing free-agent
markets and situations.
had not previously considered. Or perhaps the FAC's efforts convince the organiza-
tion to reconsider its decision to fire or not re-sign a star.
16 We are aware that empowering FACs this way could disrupt the plans of
management vis-ii-vis compensation. For instance, management may wish to reward
recently improving players more than players with equivalent statistics but who
have plateaued or worsened over the years. FACs might have other objectives, which
theoretically could conflict with management's strategy. In corporate law, share-
holders are generally not the managers for various reasons, and perhaps there are
similarly valid reasons to deny fans this kind of influence. Importantly, manage-
ment is independent of the fans and can always resist their efforts if they think the
fans are misguided, since the team remains wholly separate from the FAC. Whether
epistemic deference to management is something that should be granted in the first
instance is a more complicated question and we discuss some of the costs and bene-
fits regarding epistemic deference to management, infra in Part II.B.7."
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Payments to FACs could consist of a few large contributions from a
small number of wealthy fans, many small contributions from a large num-
ber of non-wealthy fans, or even symbolic payments from the youngest
fans. 7 Most likely, it combines all of the above. If the Veronica Mars Kick-
starter project is typical, then there is no reason to believe similar numbers
of fans could not raise sufficient money, on top of the star's actual salary, to
provide an additional incentive for the star to join their favorite team.
Granted, it likely will not be sufficient to thoroughly replace the player's
salary or to overcome a team's lowball offer. However, FACs are not in-
tended to replace the organization, only to facilitate fans' influencing the
organization's recruiting or retention efforts. When competing salary offers
from competing teams are relatively close, the extra FAC money may pro-
vide a meaningful incentive to a player to sign with one team.
Moreover, while we initially envision this as a way to help attract tal-
ent to teams, fans could use FACs to express support for players and teams
for any number of reasons, such as rewarding a current player for exceptional
performance (perhaps the player is, relative to the league, "underpaid") or
helping a player who has gotten in trouble with the league by collecting
money to offset his fine.1 8 It even is conceivable that a group of anti-fans
could use a FAC to express dislike for a player through negative incen-
tives-say, by pledging money to convince a player to play for a different
team or to retire.
The critical requirement-at least in the team sports context-is that
FACs remain independent of the organization because, in some sports,
league rules prohibit coordination or cooperation between fans and the team
17 Ohm Youunmisuk, BrandonJacobs Bonds with Fan, ESPN.coM (June 21, 2012,
9:04 PM), http://espn.go.com/new-york/nfl/story/id/8080528/san-francisco-49ers-
brandon- jacobs -refills- joseph-armento -piggy-bank (discussing a six-year-old fan
who sent an NFL player $3.36 upon hearing that the player's former team could not
afford to pay him).
"' This is ripe for abuse, of course. If players suspect they would be immunized
from the financial consequences of breaking rules, crowdsourcing would create a
moral hazard in which bad behavior is incentivized. This sort of payment should be
limited to league, rather than legal, trouble, and only when the fine was deemed
"unjust." In a somewhat analogous example, fans of the University of Mississippi
donated more than $75,000 in a matter of hours to cover costs and fines the univer-
sity incurred after fans ran on the field and tore down the goalposts following a
football victory. Hugh Kellenberger, Fans Have Covered Costs of Ole Miss' Goalposts,
Fine, THE CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 8, 2014, http://www.clarionledger.com/story/
mississippistatesports/20 14 /10/07/ole -miss -goalposts -fans -fundraising/ 16870129/.
This example lacks that moral hazard, since the fans were paying for costs they
created through their misconduct, rather than indemnifying another's misconduct.
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in putting together offers to players. Accordingly, there must be one ex-
change between team and talent, entirely independent of FAC-raised and -
pledged funds; FAC funds operate independently of the primary
relationship.
This raises the final issue: If crowdfunded money is a supplement to
that basic agreement, where should these funds go? We see two likely
options.
First is a direct compensation model, under which FACs pay the money
directly to the star. This would comprise additional income for the player,
comparable to outside income athletes regularly earn from endorsements and
appearances. And that income would be taxable as such; it comes attached to
a quid pro quo ("We will give you this money if you sign with Team X"),
making it compensation to the player as part of a market exchange, not a
mere gift from the fans.19
Alternatively, under what we call the charitable model, FACs could give
the money to a charity associated with the talent. Many professional athletes
and other entertainers establish charitable foundations, dedicated to causes
ranging from at-risk youth to the quality of life for cancer patients.20 Some-
times these charitable endeavors are quite personal to the star.21 Some ath-
letes even negotiate contributions to their foundation as an explicit part of
their contracts with teams or other entities with which they do business.22
In fact, with James's free agency pending in 2014, two Miami radio hosts
organized LeBron-a-thon, urging fans to donate money to Boys and Girls
Club of Broward County (a cause with which James has long been involved)
as a show of support and affection for the player.23
The charitable model may provide the additional benefit that money
donated by fans to a charitable foundation will not (likely) qualify as income
to the star, assuming the star is not directly coordinating with the fans or
19 C.I.R. v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960).
20 PEYBACK FOUNDATION, http://www.peytonmanning.com/peyback-foundation
(last visited Sept. 22, 2012); THE BREES DREAM FOUNDATION, www.drewbrees
.com/foundation (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).
21 For example, one former football player's foundation works with autism, in
honor of the player's son, who lives with autism. DOUG FLUTIE JR. FOUNDATION
FOR AUTISM, http://www.dougflutiejrfoundation.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
22 DAVE WINFIELD, WINFIELD: A PLAYER'S LIFE (1988) (discussing conflicts with
team ownership over payments team promised to pay to charitable foundation).
23 WQAM's Crowder Donates $1000 to Keep LeBron james in Miami, 560 WQAM,
(June 27, 2014), http://wqam.com/2014/06/27/wqams-crowder-donates-1000-to-
keep-lebron-james-in-miami/; see also Howard Wasserman, Catalyzing Miami Heat
Fans, PRAWFsBLAWG, (June 30, 2014, 9:01 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/201 4 /06/catalyzing-miami-heat-fans.html.
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directing their contributions to any particular place.24 And because the
money is going to charitable organizations, there is even some possibility
that fan contributions will be tax deductible, as would an ordinary indepen-
dent contribution to the player's foundation.2 5 The IRS might be suspicious
of this arrangement, of course.26 An alternative tax treatment would treat
FAC donations as includable income to the talent, then tax-deductible (up
to a point) by him as a charitable donation to his own foundation.27
Either way, we ultimately doubt tax issues will substantially affect
fans' willingness to either organize a FAC or contribute to it. First, typical
fans are motivated more by love of their team than by tax benefits, so even
non-deductibility is unlikely to deter participation. The general success of
crowdfunding in other contexts shows that people are willing to spend on
these sorts of efforts without needing tax benefits, especially when individ-
ual donations are relatively small. Second, many low- and middle-income
fans that would make small contributions to support their favorite players
and teams may not take itemized deductions; their inability to deduct the
contribution would therefore not affect their tax situation. Seeing plausible
arguments on both sides, we leave further exploration of the tax issues for
another forum.
Our strong preference is for the charitable model. As we show in the
next Part, both models are subject to various concerns and objections, which
we hopefully show are unfounded. But the charitable model offers some
comparative public policy and public-relations advantages, making it the
normatively preferable approach to this type of crowdfunding.
24 C.I.R. v. Giannini, 129 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1942).
2' 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2006).
26 The tax law issues raised here are somewhat tricky. On one hand, one might
question whether fan contributions should be deductible. The sine qua non of a chari-
table contribution is that money or property is transferred without adequate consid-
eration, meaning only "unrequited" payments qualify for deduction. See Hernandez
v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1989). This is determined by examining the ex-
ternal features of the transaction, without regard to the taxpayer's subjective moti-
vations. Id. at 691; McLennan v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 102, 106 (Cl. Ct. 1991).
FAC payments, even as charitable contributions, involve a quid pro quo-"here is
money that we fans will donate to your foundation if you sign with the team."
That said, we can envision two arguments in favor of deductibility. First, any
benefit to the donors is "intangible," merely the psychic benefit of having a great
player on their team and giving their team a chance to win. Second, any such bene-
fit is "incidental or tenuous," lacking any value so as to make the contributions a
non-deductible purchase. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4941(d)-2(0(2); William A. Drennan,
Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable Naming Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 45,
56 (2011).
2726 U.S.C. § 170(b).
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II. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
This Part considers a variety of anticipated obstacles and objections to
our proposal. Our hope is that we will reveal these impediments or chal-
lenges to be surmountable, particularly where funding efforts are directed to
charity.
A. League Reactions
Outside of professional team sports, there is every reason to think that
the FAC model could be used effectively to influence the choices talent
make regarding where and whether to perform, teach, or cook, etc. But,
professional team sports raise an unusual set of issues. The principal chal-
lenge is that leagues will invoke concerns about competitive balance, refer-
ring to their various regulations and contracts to generate arguments that
might prevent FACs from affecting team relationships with the talent. That
said, we can also imagine why leagues also might come to support FACs, in
which case, it remains speculative as to what teams will think about FACs
and crowdfunding.
1. An Optimistic Scenario for FACs
On the positive side, we could see why teams and leagues will embrace
FACs, and even welcome and celebrate that level of involvement and influ-
ence. After all, it is not unprecedented for fans to hold a stake in the rela-
tionship between teams and talent. The NFL's Green Bay Packers, for
example, are a community-owned team.28 With a storied history and
legendarily committed fan base, the Packers demonstrate that the public can
be effective stakeholders in a team without running afoul of the law or dis-
turbing competitive balance. Similarly, the Seattle Sounders FC, a profes-
sional soccer team, has invited input from season ticket-holders and official
booster-club members on team matters that are far from ceremonial and that
comprise significant operating decisions, including choosing a team nick-
name and deciding whether to retain the team's general manager.2 9
FACs, of course, are distinct from both situations. A FAC seeks to
encourage a player, who already shares mutual interest with the team, to
21 See Community: Shareholders, PACKERS.COM, http://www.packers.com/commu-
nity/shareholders.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
29 Sounders FC First Fan Vote for General Manager, SOUNDERSFC.coM, http://www
.soundersfc.com/news/articles/2012/09-september/gm-vote.aspx (last visited Oct.
20, 2012).
2015 / Catalyzing Fans
make a choice about his place of employment. But it does not go much
farther; the FAC is not seeking, for instance, to control the team's manage-
ment of its concession stands. The basic logic remains the same, however:
fans act as stakeholders and, through FACs, more directly try to influence
the players, and thus, the team.
2. A Pessimistic Scenario for FACs
Less optimistically, teams may be apprehensive about fans linking
themselves financially to players, particularly on the direct compensation
model, where a FAC is essentially paying money directly to the talent. The
basic objection rests with leagues' commitments to competitive balance and
parity. The leagues' goal is to preserve an association of teams all possessing
a reasonable chance to pay, attract, and retain top players, and thus to com-
pete for championships. Without some efforts meant to achieve parity across
teams, the competitive balance theory goes, fans will lose interest if their
favorite teams cannot compete." Accordingly, team owners divide revenue
among teams and players and establish manageable annual increases in
player salaries.31 Teams and leagues may fear that FACs, by offering players
the possibility of substantial additional money, will upset that sought-after
parity and balance.
The question before us is whether a league, under current rules, could
do anything to stop FACs from forming and operating. The answer is "no,"
although the issue warrants discussion. We use the National Basketball As-
sociation (NBA) to illustrate the point, in part because fan funding of free
agents likely would be most effective in that sport, where the addition of
one or two great players, attracted to the team with the help of FAC money,
may turn a team into a championship contender. Regardless, the analysis
and conclusions should be substantially the same as to all major professional
sports team leagues.
It is tempting to think of a sports league as an "it" that speaks with
one voice. In truth, the major professional leagues are associations of inde-
30 John R. Crooker & Aju J. Fenn, Sports Leagues and Parity: When League Parity
Generates Fan Enthusiasm, 8 J. SPORTS ECON. 139, 141 (2007); Andrew S. Zimbalist,
Competitive Balance in Sports Leagues: An Introduction, 3 J. SPORTS ECON. 111, 112
(2002).
31 Zach Lowe, NBA Labor Negotiations Enter Crunch Time, SICOM (Sept. 28, 2011,
11:29 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/nba/blogs/nba-point-for-
ward/201 1/09/28/nba-labor- negotiations -enter-crunch-time/index.html.
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pendently owned franchises. 2 For example, the NBA is an unincorporated
association of thirty independently owned franchises, run by a board of gov-
ernors comprised of one representative from each franchise. 3 The NBA's
commissioner centralizes league operations and serves as the league's official
voice. 4
In challenging FAC payments, the NBA could draw upon three sources
of rules: 1) the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") negotiated be-
tween the league and the players' union; 2) the uniform player contract be-
tween the individual player and his team, attached to and incorporated into
the CBA;35 and 3) the league constitution, particularly as it empowers the
commissioner to act in the "best interests" of the game.
3 6
a. Conventional Agreements and Sources
For our purposes, it is safe to say that the CBA and uniform contract
together control player compensation. Most notably, NBA teams can only
pay players through their employment contracts.37 They cannot offer invest-
ment opportunities, property and vehicle transfers, or other potential forms
of services compensation. Teams are also barred from naming a player as a
player-coach and paying him two salaries or from giving an equity stake in
the team.
38
32 The exception is Major League Soccer, in which the league owns all the teams,
then surrenders control of individual teams to certain investors only as to particular
matters. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2002).
33 See Michael A. McCann, The NBA and the Single Entity Defense: A Better Case?, 1
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 40, 49 (2010) (discussing the league's corporate form and
system of governance).
34 Id.
35 See NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. II, § 1 (2011) (stating that a
player contract must be a Uniform Player Contract) [hereinafter NBA Agreement].
36 Id. at Exhibit A 5(d) (incorporating by reference Article 35 of League Con-
stitution). Like other leagues and players' associations, the NBA and National Bas-
ketball Players' Association use CBAs to regulate players' working conditions.
Leagues are motivated to collectively bargain rules because such bargained rules, so
long as they relate to players' wages, hours and other working conditions, are ex-
empt from Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v.
NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 740-41 (2010).
37 NBA Agreement, supra note 33, § 12 (c), (d).
3" NBA Agreement, supra note 33, art. XXIX, § 8 ("[N]o NBA player may
acquire or hold a direct or indirect interest in the ownership of any NBA team.").
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The CBA also imposes non-negotiable minimum and maximum
boundaries on player salaries and contract length. 9 Even the best players can
only sign for a maximum of five years with their team.40 Although maxi-
mum salaries depend on several factors-including a player's NBA service
time and the amount of annual income received by the NBA and its subsidi-
aries-a "maximum" contract signed in 2012 was expected to be worth
about $19 million per season. 1 Collective bargaining has also gently capped
the total money teams can spend on player salaries, imposing a "luxury tax"
on teams that spend beyond the cap.42 Teams and players are further prohib-
ited from negotiating bonuses based on team success,43 although the uni-
form player contract may be amended to provide monetary incentives for a
player's individual success, as defined from earning awards or achieving sta-
tistical benchmarks. 4
Importantly, the NBA has strictly enforced the prohibition on players
receiving compensation from teams outside of their employment contract.45
Penalties include fines of up to $3 million, the loss of draft picks, and void-
46ing of the player contract at issue.
While the uniform player contract and CBA primarily govern compen-
sation matters, the NBA league constitution mostly controls internal opera-
tions and the relationship between teams and the league. Importantly, the
constitution is drafted by league officials, owners, and their representatives,
and it regulates their actions without touching players directly. That said,
the constitution's "best interests clause" is incorporated by reference in the
uniform player contract, which itself is incorporated by reference in the
CBA, thus binding the players. That clause empowers the commissioner to
sanction any player who, in the commissioner's determination, makes state-
ments injurious to "the best interests of basketball or of the Association" or
commits misconduct that conflicts with notions of morality and fair play.
39 Ira Winderman, NBA CBA: Official NBA Agreement Document, SUNSENTINEL
.COM (Nov. 27, 2011, 9:49 AM), http://blogs.sun-sentinel.com/sports-basketball-
heat/201 1/11/nba-cba-official-nba-agreement-document.html.
40 See Larry Coon, NBA Salary CAP FAQ: 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement,




43 NBA Agreement, supra note 33, at Exhibit A 3(c) (2005).
44 Id. art. II, § 3(b).
45 See Coon, supra note 40.
46 Id.
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Nevertheless, the clause has seldom been invoked, and it is typically
limited to cases of player misconduct on (or off) the court. 47 That said, the
expansive wording theoretically empowers the NBA to bar a player from
taking money from fans on the grounds that doing so would undermine
"fair play."
The problem with such a broad reading is that it is impossible to real-
istically distinguish a range of unquestionably permissible outside income
available to players from FAC income. As discussed earlier, a direct payment
from a FAC would simply constitute another source of income for the player
who signs with a given team. Players receive income from a range of sources
beyond their teams, most obviously through commercial endorsements. In
2013, LeBron James, then the NBA's best player, earned $17.6 million per
year from his team but $39 million per year in endorsements. 4 Less obvi-
ously, players earn income through other activities, including appearances in
films. 4 9 While these opportunities all trade on the player's fame and athletic
success, none of this income is deemed to contravene salary limitations or
other league regulations.
One might try to distinguish FAC payments from ordinary endorse-
ments because of differences in what the talent does to earn that money.
Endorsement money is earned in exchange for endorsing a product, not for
playing a sport, and an endorsement deal may last beyond the player's con-
tract with the team and even beyond his playing career. FACs give some-
thing to (or for the benefit of) the player purely in consideration of his
playing the game for a particular team for a period of time-precisely what
is covered by his playing contract. But this distinction is not inherent or
necessarily true in every case. Endorsement deals (especially for players who
are not the greatest superstars) could be structured to last only as long as the
player remains an active player for the team. Moreover, a company benefits
from having an athlete endorse its product only if he plays his sport at a
high level, meaning the money is at least indirectly related to player
performance.
47 See, e.g., NBA v. Nat'l Basketball Players Ass'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26244, *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing NBA's use of best interests clause to
punish Indiana Pacer Jermaine O'Neal for misconduct during a game).
48 Craig Davis, LeBron Second-Highest Paid Athlete in U.S., SUN-SENTINEL.COM
(May 15, 2013), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-05-15/sports/sfl-lebron-sec
ondhighest-paid-athlete-in-us-20130515 1 lebron-james-endorsements-si-list.
49 See Ballers Being Actors, OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 10, 2011, at 13B (listing NBA
players who have appeared in movies, including Michael Jordan in Space jam
(Warner Brothers Pictures, et al. 1996), Ray Allen in He Got Game (40 Acres & A
Mule Filmworks, et al. 1998), and Shaquille O'Neal in Blue Chips (Paramount Pic-
tures 1994)).
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No matter the league's concern for how FACs might affect competitive
balance, current league rules and regulations do not preclude FAC payments
to players. Of course, a league always could seek to change these rules in
subsequent rounds of collective bargaining, but only with consent of the
players' union.
b. Corruption and the Best Interests Power
Alternatively, the commissioner might assert the "best interests"
power out of concerns for corruption. Professional athletes have historically
not been above taking payoffs from gamblers to throw games.50 The NBA is
also especially sensitive in the wake of a former referee pleading guilty to
charges stemming from corruption.51
On the margin, FACs might increase opportunities for organized crime
to influence players. But flatly prohibiting fans from monetizing their sup-
port for their teams and their players out of fear of nefarious actors seems an
unnecessary over-reaction. Players willing to engage with gamblers or or-
ganized crime do not need FACs as a vehicle to do so, just as organized
criminals seeking to influence athletes do not need FACs as a vehicle to do
so. Moreover, FACs present an ineffectual vehicle for gamblers or criminals
seeking to influence sports. Their contributions would be mixed in with
legitimate contributions from legitimate fans, diluting any connection or
influence they hope to establish. Even with FACs, gamblers and criminals
appear more likely to employ an existing method of influence: illegal direct
payments to players to use less than best efforts.
c. Tortious Interference With Contract?
Even if a league's internal rules do not currently prohibit FAC activity,
there remains the question of whether general principles of private law
might give leagues or team owners a basis to object to FACs. A team might
claim that, by offering something of value to the talent, the FAC tortiously
interferes with the talent's contractual relationship or prospective business
relations with that team.
But neither claim works. As to a contractual relationship, the players
targeted by FACs would be free agents not in a contractual relationship with
'0 E.g., ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAw 5 (1998)
(discussing Chicago Black Sox scandal, in which eight players threw the 1919
World Series).
51 Howard Beck, Donaghy's Charges Weigh on a League, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2008, at Dl.
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any team and free to make decisions about where and whether they per-
form.52 With regards to prospective business relations, most courts require
overtly wrongful misconduct independent of the interference itself before
finding tort liability.53 On this understanding of the tort, mere persuasion
(for example, a pledge to give $ 5 million to a player's charitable foundation)
to break a relationship is not sufficiently wrongful. Rather, the wrongful act
must be "proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common
law, or other determinable legal standard." 54 Furthermore, this argument is
even less plausible when fan money goes to charity, such that the FAC is not
giving the player anything.
B. Policy Considerations
Beyond existing league regulations and general principles of private
law, FACs may be subject to a range of normative objections. That is, even if
FACs (on either a direct compensation or charitable model) are permissible
under law and league rules, they may simply be a bad idea.
In this section, we respond to a cluster of possible policy objections to
FACs following the direct compensation model. Some of them are really
only plausible in the professional sports team context while others are more
generally applicable.
1. The Rich Get Richer .. .and What Do Fans Get?
The Distributive Justice Objection
The obvious objection, particularly to a direct compensation scheme, is
that there is something facially unseemly about little Timmy breaking open
his piggybank to enrich already-wealthy basketball stars.
As between fans and particular athletes, the "rich getting richer" con-
cern is not a decisive normative objection in a society that already distrib-
52 See Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L.
REV. 335 (1980); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 & 767 (1979).
53 Sections 766 and 767 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which govern
these "interference" torts, require that the defendant's behavior be "improper." See
also Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1978)
(interference with economic relations requires evidence that the "injury to another
is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself."); Della
Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 746, 755-57 (Cal. 1995)
(Mosk, J. concurring in judgment) (arguing that interference torts are dangerous
encroachments on values of free speech, free competition, and free association, and
thus should be narrowly applied).
54 Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 954 (Cal. 2003).
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utes many goods and services through markets. As philosopher Robert
Nozick famously argued, one could begin with a perfectly egalitarian distri-
bution of wealth, but if there is a great basketball talent (he uses the 1960s
exemplar, Wilt Chamberlain) who wants to charge people a quarter to watch
him play, then he will end up with more money from others because of the
joy he provides them.55 That inequality is not an obvious injustice. If fans
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently make these payments, and do so
with awareness that they may earn nothing tangible in return, there is little
reason to stop them by blocking that exchange.
Nozick's position is not free of controversy, of course. After all, one
must believe that, notwithstanding voluntary distributions, the quality of
consumer deliberations and resource allocations is beyond question. If people
are spending money foolishly or in tension with their prior commitments,
the mere fact of voluntary exchange between consumer and supplier may be
morally inadequate to support the new pattern of inequality. 6 Still, to block
the free exchange between talent and fans acting through a FAC is presump-
tively problematic when viewed against the backdrop of all other voluntary
market-based exchanges in professional sports and entertainment, many of
which directly involve fans.57
To be sure, we need not accept the current convention, which encour-
ages sports fans to share their money with teams but not with talent as such.
But as long as we permit fan-team transactions, along with other deals in
which third parties reward players for endorsements or appearances, then the
"rich getting richer" objection to FACs seems quite peculiar. It is hard to
know why exchanges involving FACs and players would be uniquely unjust
or morally undesirable compared with exchanges between a company and its
professional-athlete endorser. At best, one can say that this is a set of free
choices that, all other things being equal, makes the distribution of re-
sources less equal. It is still not clear, however, why the fact of the resulting
inequality is adequate to block this exchange.58
Some might press the distributive justice option further by suggesting
that FACs will only further shut out poor fans, since, on the margins, those
with less money will have less influence on the exit or loyalty options of
" See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).
56 These are two of the reasons traditionally raised in opposition to gambling.
17 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS 163-79 (2012) (discussing and critiquing the "skyboxification" of sports
through named stadiums, luxury skyboxes, and autographed sports memorabilia).
58 Presumably the tax system or other institutions could be used to alleviate the
harms associated with these resulting inequalities too.
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their favorite stars. Such concern is, at first blush, an understandable one.59
However, we are talking about commercial sports and entertainment. As
long as we have accepted a market for distributing access and influencing
the decisions made in professional sports or restaurants or television broad-
casting, we must accept that there will be patterns of inequality related to
consumption and enjoyment. Distributive justice obligations are far more
pressed to prioritize access to medical care, food, adequate housing, daycare,
and education (and reasonably so). Put bluntly, creating opportunities for
the poor to influence where Wilt Chamberlain (or to bring Nozick into the
21st century, LeBron James) plays is, comparatively speaking, hardly a
moral urgency.
2. Will FACs Be Futile?
A second policy objection to FACs is the prospect of futility. Stated
briefly, fan payments and pledges may have no material effect on a player's
decision if competing FACs cancel one another out with equal competing
offers. The talent then chooses whichever team offer is better, which means
he lands precisely where he would have landed without FACs; fans will not
have influenced the choice. If FACs from different cities are just competing
against each other in pointless stalemates, then fans themselves may ration-
ally forbear from forming or engaging with FACs. Alternatively, fans of one
team might not agree on which player to support, so they organize and
contribute to rival FACs dedicated to influencing different players; if the
competition splits the team's fan base, neither FAC may have enough money
pledged to influence the player.
Our principal response is that the futility objection is wholly specula-
tive. The claim that FAC payments will lead to stalemates is an empirical
'9 For example, Sandel distinguishes our having a market economy to our being a
market society. On his view, we must be wary of two concerns about market values
pervading society. First, there is the unfairness to those less financially fortunate
because they will be shut out from purchasing the goods or services that would
otherwise be distributed along nonmarket values such as queue or luck or desert.
Second, there is the concern that market-based thinking across various domains will
somehow corrupt or injure the civic values and experiences associated with those
goods. Thus, when companies hire homeless people to stand in line for lobbyists to
get a seat at a congressional hearing, Sandel argues, we are exhibiting a misguided
set of values that debases our political culture. SANDEL, supra note 57, at 10.
While we may be sympathetic to those claims in the context of political con-
tributions or who gets to attend congressional hearings, we don't think Sandel's two
principal criticisms (unfairness and corruption) have much traction against FACs in
professional team sports for reasons adumbrated later.
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prediction, not a fact. As with political financing by crowds instead of cen-
tralized public financing, there is always the chance that crowdsourced fi-
nancing in sports will allow for influence or surprises, and some of these
might turn out to be for the better. Taken seriously, the futility objection
also has no stopping point, as it would suggest that market distributions of
virtually all goods and services are inappropriate because competing pur-
chasers might refuse to buy above a certain price.
More importantly, we reject the suggestion that fans enjoy no benefits
if they pledge money to an unsuccessful recruiting effort. Rather, fans still
might enjoy the purely expressive benefit of having tried to lure or retain a
favorite player on their preferred team, of showing support for their teams,
and of being able to share in that process of trying to better their team. Fans
are going to be talking and fretting about the team's efforts to sign free
agents, which has absolutely no effect on the outcome; contributing money
towards these efforts cannot have any less influence and just might have
some.
Fans already spend a substantial amount of money on their love of
sports-in tickets, merchandise, cable television packages, and even taxes to
fund new stadiums and arenas.60 And, as one study shows, their willingness
to pay for games and merchandise increases when star players are in those
games or associated with the merchandise.61 FACs would only enhance fans'
connection to star players and capitalize on their willingness to spend for
stars. If fans are willing to do so, it is because they value the expressive
benefit of their expenditures independent of whether they actually tip the
balance of a player's decision.
Importantly, FAC contributions measure not only fan support of the
team and its player (which ticket sales or television ratings already do), but
also the intensity of that support. The amount fans pledge is a financial
indicator of how much fans want that player to join or remain on their team
and how much they want their team to succeed. FACs, in other words, be-
come economically useful or efficiency-promoting whenever firms are other-
wise unsuccessful at engaging in optimal levels of price discrimination.
When price discrimination occurs, it facilitates an increase in the likelihood
of value-adding transactions between willing buyers and sellers.
Moreover, these transactions are all voluntary. Unlike taxpayers com-
pelled to support a new stadium through mandatory taxes, fans who wish
60 We might even think of such taxes as a form of crowdfunding, albeit indi-
rectly with respect to the talent and potentially involuntary.
61 See Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Superstars in the National Bas-
ketball Association: Economic Value and Policy, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 586 (1997).
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not to participate in a FAC need not do so. Those who do wish to participate
gain an avenue for expression and influence that they do not currently enjoy.
Given the various ways people spend their money foolishly, crowdfunding
mechanisms to benefit talent (or their charities) constitute a relatively harm-
less perversion. On the upside, it may foster a sense of community or civic
pride and generate money for charitable causes.
A final futility argument is that this simply will not work because the
FAC will not raise sufficient amounts as to offer a meaningful incentive to
the star. Again, this is speculative. More importantly, the success and
growth of crowdfunding suggests reason for optimism. The producers of a
movie raised money from 91,000 fans.62 If Los Angeles Lakers fans raised a
comparable $62 per person from a similar number of fans, that means $5
million to offer for the benefit of a superstar player, on top of the $19 mil-
lion he gets from the team. That certainly may be significant enough to
affect the player's calculus in choosing his team.
3. Do Bigger Cities Unjustifiably Get Better Teams?
The next objection has less to do with distributive injustices involving
money and more with patterns that distribute talent unevenly. On this
view, FACs will probably be more successful in larger cities with larger and
wealthier fan bases, thereby unfairly disadvantaging teams in smaller
markets.
To understand this concern better, consider how the NBA treats broad-
casting revenue. While NBA teams equally divide national television reve-
nue to the tune of approximately $30 million per team, they keep their own
local broadcasting revenue, which in some cases, is substantially larger.63
This arrangement has led to enormous disparities; while the Los Angeles
Lakers receive $150 million in local broadcasting revenue, the Sacramento
Kings snag just $11 million.64
It is probably true that teams in large cities will have more fans, on
average, than teams in small cities, and more fans usually means more
money. This is not an ineluctable truth; perhaps a billionaire such as Bill
62 See Cohen, supra note 11.
63 See Steve Aschburner, Revenue Sharing a Vital (Yet Secretive) Component to Talks,
NBA.coM (Sept. 21, 2011, 8:09 AM), http://www.nba.com/2011/news/featuresl
steve aschburner/09/20/revenue-sharing-still-vital/index.html.
64 See Tom Ziller, Sacramento Kings Win Second Life, and NBA's Economic Inequity
Has Never Been More Important, SB NATION (May 2, 2011, 1:51 PM), http://www
.sbnation.com/nba/2011/5/2/2149458/sacramento-kings-relocation-maloofs-
anaheim.
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Gates is a fan of the poorest team and he is willing to bankroll a FAC. The
original point does have an intuitive feel to it, however. Perhaps we should
feel sheepish about creating yet another situation where teams from large
cities benefit by virtue of the largeness of the city to which they are
attached.
This is a complicated question and we do not hope to resolve it here
with any firmness. But the answer again emphasizes the presumptively de-
fensible virtues of allowing people to make their own free choices. Large
cities become large in part because they are doing something right to retain
or attract people to live there. In a world where jurisdictional competition
(i.e., federalism) is a non-laughable explanation for why some cities and
states succeed while others do not,65 there might be reason to credit the
claims of large cities (or, more precisely, their boosters) that such cities
should be rewarded for creating attractive places to live. To the extent cities
are able to draw and keep talent based on good governance; professional,
educational, and economic opportunities; or other distinctive virtues, then it
is not clear why FACs associated with teams in vibrant cities should be
hindered. Preserving some market incentives for cities to innovate or govern
well is an article of faith for the jurisdictional competition literature.66 If
more successful FACs are one way in which that good governance is re-
warded, we should be leery of regulating them simply because they are asso-
ciated with teams in large cities.
Moreover, the important consideration is not the size of the media mar-
ket in which the team plays but the size of a team's fan base. The two are
not necessarily co-extensive, particularly in the age of individual mobility,
the Internet, and national media. "Red Sox Nation" extends well beyond
New England; many small-market teams-such as the NFL's Green Bay
Packers and the NBA's Oklahoma City Thunder-enjoy broad national fol-
lowings. A FAC can reach fans in the diaspora, who may welcome the
chance to contribute and to feel more closely connected to their team. More-
over, because crowdfunding works through many smaller contributions, the
significant factor in a FAC's success may be the number of fans supporting
the team, not the wealth of individual (or even average) fans. If, as we ex-
65 The classic piece on jurisdictional competition is Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). For other discussions, see
generally, Doron Teichman, The Market for CriminalJustice: Federalism, Crime Control,
and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1833 (2005); William W.
Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics ofJurisdictional Competition: Devo-
lutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201 (1997).
66 See sources cited supra note 65.
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pect, fans of all teams will develop their own FACs, market competition
among fan bases will bolster market competition among teams.
Two final points. First, as with the "rich get richer" objection, this one
suffers from a baseline problem. That large cities may benefit more from
FACs is not a persuasive reason to oppose them. After all, leagues and teams
have never attempted to tie player salaries to outside income or to limit or
prohibit players from earning as much endorsement income as possible. Nor
have they suggested lowering the salary cap or salary-offer figures for teams
in large cities because players can earn more in outside income by playing
there.67 Indeed, leagues and teams have made no efforts to preclude outside
income at all, including outside income that is available precisely because
the player is a star and his stardom may be enhanced by living in a media-
drenched location. There is no reason to single out income paid directly by
fans as uniquely subject to leveling.
In addition, talented stars consider a number of factors in choosing
where to perform or play; these include state tax implications, opportunities
to contend for championships or other prizes, proximity to family, desirable
weather, and social opportunities. A league's collective bargaining agree-
ment, its uniform player contracts, and its constitution in no way regulate
these considerations because they fall outside the collective bargaining rela-
tionship. A FAC payment is basically no different.
4. The Shibboleth of Competitive Balance: Does Wealth Disparity
Diminish Competitive Enterprises?
The next objection is that, holding all else equal, competitive sports
are more attractive or aesthetically enjoyable when the playing field is not
distorted by wealth. Regardless of whether players receive anything, fan con-
tributions are designed to persuade players to play for one team instead of
others.
But as one sports economist has observed, competitive balance "is like
wealth. Everyone agrees it's a good thing to have, but no one knows how
much one needs. "68 Or what exactly it means. We try to unpack some of the
difficulties of this claim as it touches the case for FACs.
First, assuming that competition is good and that competition is hurt
by wealth disparity, this argument is less relevant in non-sports commercial
67 In other words, the New York Knicks are not limited to paying their top
player only $15 million per year, because he can get $4 million in endorsements
playing in New York, while the Memphis Grizzlies are able to pay $18 million
because endorsement opportunities in Memphis are only worth $1 million.
68 Zimbalist, supra note 30, at 111.
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entertainment contexts that are less directly competitive, such as the recruit-
ment, retention, or direction of chefs, newscasters, musicians, stage actors,
etc. If FACs emerge in those areas, there are no real competitive balance
considerations worthy of extended deliberation.
Second, even focusing on professional team sports, the argument is
merely that FACs make watching sports worse in some way. But many as-
pects of professional sports might have similar effects, so it again is not clear
that FACs are distinctly unjust or deserving of specially unfavorable treat-
ment. Ultimately, skepticism toward private ordering in this context must
be justified, as must skepticism toward one particular form of private
ordering.
Third, as economist Allen Sanderson argues, competitive balance is not
solely a product of resource distribution and allocation. 9 Indeed, there are
many non-pecuniary influences on competition-technology, demography,
playing rules, playing conditions, science, and medicine. With respect to
these influences, leagues and fans welcome and applaud adaptation and in-
novation, even when it gives some teams a competitive advantage.7 0 Moreo-
ver, it is difficult to separate "natural" from "unnatural" benefits as they
affect the development of skill and performance and, in turn, competitive
balance.7 1 There is no reason that advantages gained from wise player evalu-
ation are significantly different in kind than advantages gained from having
a larger or more affluent fan base.
Consider, for example, the rise of sabermetrics, the use of more sophis-
ticated statistical methods of player evaluation and game strategy, allowing
teams to identify and exploit inefficiencies in conventional methods strate-
gies. 2 Increasingly, teams hire front office personnel with strong math and
statistics backgrounds to maximize these strategies. As described in the
book Moneyball, baseball teams playing in small markets and working with
relatively modest budgets have outperformed larger-market, big-budget
teams.7 3 No one, however, has seriously asserted that "competitive balance"
requires that teams be restricted in the hiring of front office personnel or in
efforts to exploit inefficiencies. In that same vein, even if FACs would nega-
tively affect competitive balance, the welter of other causes that also contrib-
69 Allen R. Sanderson, The Many Dimensions of Competitive Balance, 3 J. SPORTS
ECON. 204, 205 (2002).
70 See id. at 205.
71 Id. at 220, 224.
72 Note, Losing Sight of Hindsight: The Unrealized Traditionalism of Law and
Sabermetrics, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1703, 1710-12 (2004).
73 Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (2003)
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ute to that imbalance weigh against special objections to this one, new form
of allocation.
Furthermore, as a legal matter, courts have been consistently skeptical
of leagues' competitive-balance arguments. Where sports leagues are subject
to antitrust limits, competing teams are expected to behave as competitors.
For instance, the Seventh Circuit rejected the NBA's arguments for limiting
the number of games that individual NBA franchises could broadcast on
cable.74 The league argued that its network television contracts would be
less valuable if individual teams could enter into agreements to broadcast
games to national audiences, and that some teams would enjoy an unfair
advantage in placing games on cable. 5 But the competitive balance argu-
ment fell to the concern that the limitation would have diminished fan ac-
cess to NBA games.7 6 This same interplay motivated the Supreme Court to
invalidate an NCAA rule, also motivated by competitive-balance concerns,
limiting broadcasts of college games77 and a federal district court to nix an
NFL bylaw that called for teams to equally share television revenue.78 These
decisions emphasize that competition anticipates and expects winners and
losers, an expectation that FACs advance.
Finally, competitive balance often is justified as a way to maintain fan
optimism, thereby maintaining fan interest in their team, the league, and
the sport. Fans "want to begin each season with hope and expectation.""
And given the perceived link between league parity and fan interest in the
league, a decline in the former could hamper the latter.80
But FACs enable a level of direct fan involvement that overcomes this
objection in two respects. First, if we are correct that many different fan
14 Chicago Profl Sports L.P. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
71 Id. at 675.
76 Chicago Profl Sports L.P. v. NBA, 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 71,253, at
*27 (N.D. I11. 1995); see also David A. Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust
Analysis to Promote Network Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 523, 573-75 (1999)
(providing a rich discussion of this litigation).
77 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104-15 (1984) (reasoning that rule
designed to promote competitive balance of college sports programs cannot unduly
harm consumers).
71 United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Congress re-
sponded to that decision with the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1291, which removed the NFL, along with the NBA, MLB and National Hockey
League (NHL), from the reach of Section 1 of the Sherman Act with respect to
sponsored sports broadcasting. See Phillip M. Cox II, Note, Flag on the Play? The
Siphoning Effect on Sports Television, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 571, 574 (1995).
71 Zimbalist, supra note 30, at 112.
"0 Crooker & Fenn, supra note 30, at 157-58.
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bases will create and support FACs, FACs actually may help foster competi-
tive balance by providing another incentive that teams can offer to prospec-
tive free agents. Second, even if FACs ultimately produce disparity, it is the
fans themselves creating the purported competitive imbalance through the
very interest they show for the sport and their teams. In other words, FACs
might beget competitive imbalance precisely because they result from fans
wanting their teams to succeed and wanting to express that desire moneta-
rily. We can imagine a scenario where FACs cause fans of teams from
smaller cities or with smaller fan bases to lose interest in the sport because
some big-city/large-fan-base teams come to dominate. But we also can im-
agine FACs stimulating greater fan interest and more interesting profes-
sional sports if fans see themselves as competing for affection nationwide and
trying to brand themselves in distinctive and quirky ways.
If it is not obvious, we will emphasize it again: we do not deny the
concern for competitive balance altogether. Rather, we believe those con-
cerns are over-emphasized, relevant as a critique only to professional team
sports, and thus only one activity where FACs could be used. And even such
limited concerns are generally outweighed by considerations of liberty, com-
merce, and the pleasure fans take in expressing their preferences.
5. Speech, Money, and Corruption
FACs embody the idea that there is an expressive component to at least
some financial transactions, 1 particularly charitable ones. 2 Because this ex-
pression is articulated in shekels, some might be concerned for corruption.
FACs merge political action committees (PACs) with booster clubs and
bring that union to professional sports. PACs facilitate the gathering of re-
sources and support for or against particular political candidates, parties,
positions, and causes.8 3 Booster clubs serve similar functions for high school
and college sports.
At the simplest level, booster clubs are the vehicle through which par-
ents contribute to schools to help buy uniforms or other equipment, making
the clubs indispensable to cash-strapped public schools. On the other hand,
booster clubs and high-profile individual boosters have had pernicious ef-
81 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010); N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne
Hardware, 468 U.S. 886, 908 (1982).
82 Kamerling v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2002).
83 PACs are regulated to various degrees because of the several ways in which
money corrupts the integrity of the political process. For a spirited overview of the
problem, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CON-
GRESS AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011).
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fects on big-time college 4 and even high school sports.8 5 Stories of illicit
payments-whether in cash, merchandise, sex, or drugs8 6 -suggest that
booster clubs are a problem for amateur sports. Given the negative percep-
tion of both PACs and booster clubs, why should we extend those models to
professional sports or other areas of commercial entertainment?
To the extent that the infusion of money in politics and amateur sports
is problematic, it is precisely because those are perceived as domains that
should operate under different "spheres of justice."8 7 We understand the
intuition that politics or amateur sport should be relatively immune from
the influence of money. A college football team should not win a champion-
ship just because its boosters are wealthy, just as a candidate should not win
an election because her supporters are billionaires willing to flood the air-
waves with political ads. Professional sports, by contrast, are principally a
form of commercial entertainment and thus should be amenable to argu-
ments in favor of private ordering: no different than the norms governing
restaurants, airport fiction, and network TV shows. As such, there is no
intrinsic reason why the norms of commerce and private ordering should not
govern in that domain. 8
For what it is worth, this vision of politics as being above or beyond
money has been losing support in the political and legal arena.8 9The real
concern with the influence of money in politics is corruption-that an
elected official will be indebted to, and subject to undue influence by, his
funders.9 ° That concern seems inapplicable to fans giving money to talent
(or their preferred charities) in professional sports and other fields of com-
mercial entertainment. As discussed earlier, the only quidpro quo risk as to
professional athletes-gamblers or criminals with access to the players-is
unlikely to arise through FAC activities.
84 Charles Robinson, Renegade Miami Football Booster Spells Out Illicit Benefits to
Players, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 16, 2011, 5:37 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/
renegade-miami-football-booster-spells-213700753-spt.html.
85 H.G. Bissinger, Friday Night Lights: A Town, a Team, and a Dream (1990).
86 Robinson, supra note 84.
87 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (1983). See also Sandel, supra note 57.
88 And that is why we are largely unmoved by Professor Sandel's complaints
about the new markets in sports autographs, naming rights of stadiums, and
skyboxes in professional sports arenas. See SANDEL, supra note 57, at 163-79.
89 As a First Amendment matter, paupers and billionaires, not to mention corpo-
rations and unions, can spend lots of money with little restriction (or even trans-
parency) in advancing their preferred political positions, issues, groups, and
candidates. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337-40; MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY
TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY (2002).
90 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359-60.
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6. Salary Concerns
One might object that FACs will hurt players by lowering their sala-
ries, as teams leverage FAC pledges to reduce what they must pay. This is
the same theory on which economists question the practice of tipping-that
it causes restaurants to pay lower salaries, expecting workers to make up the
difference in tips. This concern is unfounded for several reasons.
First, past experience demonstrates that teams do not reduce player
salaries or contract offers based on potential outside income. LeBron James
does not make less money, and no team would have made a lower contract
offer to him, based on his outside endorsement income. Second, to the ex-
tent teams are competing to sign star players, such an attempt to lowball
salaries would be unwise. If Team X offers less money to a player in reliance
on anticipated FAC money, it may lose out to a higher offer from Team Y,
as the player can choose to reject a lower offer that depends on the fortuity of
FAC money. Again, the relationship between the team and the talent re-
mains critical, with the FAC offering primarily a supplemental incentive to
tip an equipoise in its favor. It is unlikely teams or talent will rely on that
third party because of its speculative and contingent nature. Third, there is
nothing inherently problematic with FACs causing teams to offer (and play-
ers to accept) less money. As discussed earlier, players join (or remain with) a
particular team for a number of reasons, even at lower salary; the existence of
FAC money would merely be one more reason to do so.
In any event, this concern arises only on the direct compensation
model, and thus provides merely another reason to favor the charitable
model. No team is likely to offer less money in salary because of some
amount of money donated to the player's foundation. Of course, if a team
did that, and the talent accepted the lower offer, that exchange would pre-
sumptively benefit the foundation and its charitable efforts while enhancing
the talent's public reputation.
7. Fan Psychology and Epistemic Deference
A final set of issues relates to fan psychology and reactions. We spot
them and briefly respond here, without necessarily resolving them in full.
First, one might argue that fans will quickly become disaffected when
their money becomes directly intertwined with fickle player movements.
Fans who contributed to a FAC to lure Player A may be angry when he
returns to his original team four years later, or worse, when he asks the FAC
for more money on threat of leaving. Feeling burned once, perhaps fans will
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be reluctant to contribute to a FAC in the bidding for the next superstar to
replace the departed Player A.
But fans' anger will not necessarily stop them from contributing in the
future. Just as team management might be willing to "rent" star players for
only a year or two if it means a chance to win, fans might similarly be
willing to contribute their own money to FACs for that opportunity. Some
fans will gladly pay for two championships, even if the player departs in year
three; while disappointed by the player's departure, fans savor those two
successful seasons and likely see it as being worth the cost. Those same fans
might gladly contribute to the FAC the next time if they perceive a new
chance for additional team success.
Second, one might fear that fans, teams, and talent may all be subject
to psychologically hot and situational bargaining biases, such that FACs
may end up creating a tax on foolishness. One might even suggest that the
idea of fans becoming too attached to talent is irrational, especially in team
enterprises. On this view, fans have a transient preference and are likely to
mis-predict how sad they will be if their preferred player leaves, largely
because people revert to their mean level of happiness over time. All this
might be true. But again, if people can buy pet rocks, they can buy the
chance to influence what star player they want on their favorite basketball
team. Crowdfunding has developed and thrived on that very notion. In a free
society with a market-based economy, where voluntary exchanges are already
the dominant mode of distributing various goods and services, there is no
distinctively persuasive reason to block one voluntary exchange in commer-
cial entertainment or sports.
To be sure, the desirability of promoting athletic or other performance-
related virtues may limit the spaces in which FACs are tolerable. Indeed,
inasmuch as society should promote non-commercial virtues, the question of
whether to encourage FACs becomes, at least partially, a question of exper-
tise and deference.
This raises a distinct point: who likely better predicts what makes a
good team: fans or team management? If the latter, and if we think episte-
mic deference to those who know is warranted, perhaps FACs are unwise.
This is plausible. But consider two responses. First, as noted above, in most
cases, FACs depend on the choices of the team in question to retain or re-
cruit the talent; fan preferences will not trump those of management. For
example, a FAC would have been useless for Jeremy Lin if he wanted to stay
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with the New York Knicks once the Knicks decided they did not want to
keep him on the team.9"
Moreover, we can question how relevant epistemic deference should be
in commercial enterprises. If the owners of the professional sports team want
to manage their team poorly, that is their choice. If fans believe manage-
ment is doing a bad job, one solution is to abandon the team in protest by
not attending or watching games or otherwise giving money and support to
the team. FACs offer another way: influence (or try to influence) manage-
ment's decisions by influencing (or trying to influence) players through pay-
ments to or for their benefit, hoping to produce better results.
C. Policy Concerns Unique to the Charitable Contribution Model
As previously stated, we think the more attractive approach is for FACs
to donate money to the talent's charitable foundation or other preferred
cause. In addition to the arguments we canvassed concerning FACs above,
two additional considerations specifically support the charitable model.
1. Distributive Justice and Charitable Contributions
The distributive-justice objection to FACs largely disappears under the
charitable model. Talent, already making a lot of money, is not financially
enriched at the expense of fans, especially fans of lesser means. In fact, con-
tributions to charitable foundations usually affirmatively advance the cause
of distributive justice, because charities presumably will do, on average,
more good with the money than a private person would.92 What is more, the
opportunity to contribute through a FAC might encourage charitable en-
gagement from people who do not otherwise do much giving.
Talent also may prefer this model, using the charitable benefits to
boost their public image. A charitable FAC allows a star to proudly pro-
claim, "I am sorry to leave Team X behind, but Team Y's offer was unbeat-
able when its wonderful fans pledged another $5 million to my foundation.
91 Of course, we can also envision a third FAC model that might develop, in
which the FAC gives money to the team rather than the talent, enabling the funded
organization to defray its costs or change its priorities. For example, imagine if
billionaire Michael Bloomberg said to the New York Knicks management, "Keep
Jeremy Lin, and I'll give you $50 million." The league would no doubt have some-
thing to say about such an arrangement.
92 This assumption explains why charitable contributions are tax-advantaged. See
26 U.S.C. § 170; cf. Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 777, 785-812 (2012) (discussing welfarist arguments in favor of subsi-
dizing charitable giving).
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I must do what I can for the kids I have long been committed to helping."
We readily imagine that substantial donations to the talent's favored cause
coupled with a public-image victory may affect the choices of at least some
talent. Of course, a player might object to such charitable FAC contribu-
tions for similar reasons, complaining that fan contributions make it impos-
sible to turn down Team Y, thereby negating that $5 million donation and
creating a public-image problem.
There also is a chance that one distributive justice objection would
persist, even under the charitable model. Because charitable giving is finite,
the charity-focused FACs could engender a distribution of goods that is
worse than in a world without FACs. For this scenario to unfold, charitable
FACs would have to crowd out normatively better charitable giving. For
example, if stars choose wasteful or misguided charities, then on the margins
we might see a sub-optimal distribution of charitable dollars that would
otherwise have gone to better places.93 Rather than mitigating distributive
justice concerns, perhaps the player's charities only benefit the wealthy (e.g.,
the Center for the Study of Dressage). Moreover, concerns have been raised
about the management of some athletes' charitable foundations and the per-
centage of funds actually going to charity.94 One also might question the
motivation behind these donations-the commitment is not really to the
charitable cause, but to getting the star player to join or remain with the
team.
But the premises of crowding-out remain speculative. We have no rea-
son to believe fans would not give generously to both their usual charities
and to the charities of their sports heroes; on the margin, they might simply
buy fewer shoes, lipsticks, or tennis balls. Moreover, we have no reason to
assume that the current distribution of voluntary charitable dollars is correct
or that the talent's choice of charities are, as a whole, much worse.
2. Sports Leagues and the Charitable FAC
Although stars do not receive anything from fan donations, FACs still
are offering something of value to the player (even if the value is purely
psychological or moral) to persuade him to play for one team over another.
This still may appear to leagues as third-party intrusion into player move-
ment and distribution of talent. Our response remains the same-neither
93 Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of
Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 557 (2010).
94 Paul Lavigne, Athlete Charities Often Lack Standards, ESPN.coM (Mar. 31,
2013, 9:05 AM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/9 10902 4 /top-athletes -char-
ities -often-measure-charity-experts -say-efficient-effective -use-money.
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private law nor internal league rules prohibit fans from collecting and
spending money in a way that might influence an athlete's choices.95
Indeed, the league would stand on even weaker ground in objecting to
charitable FACs. After all, the talent is not receiving anything directly and
fans are not entering into any sort of direct business relationship with the
talent. The only people acting are the fans themselves and the foundations,
neither of which is subject to league control. Indeed, it is impossible to see a
difference between a group of fans raising $10,000 to give to a player's
foundation and a group of fans spending $10,000 to rent a billboard or an
airplane to fly a banner urging him to sign with the team.96 The league
simply lacks any authority to regulate the expenditure of independent fan
money.
It also is unlikely that a league could or would try in future collective
bargaining to prohibit charitable contributions. It would suffer a public-
relations disaster in even suggesting limits on fans' charitable contributions
or on what money foundations could accept. Even if fans explicitly attempt
to tie their contributions to the talent joining (or remaining on) their favor-
ite team, leagues will quickly realize that such efforts are not worth trying
to regulate.
Moreover, opposition to charitable contributions would strike the
league's key constituencies, including ticket-holders and corporate sponsors,
as hypocritical. It would be at odds with most leagues' own charitable ven-
tures, which have raised substantial money for various causes.97 For example,
since its creation in 2005, NBA Cares boasts that it "has raised more than
$200 million for charity, provided more than 1.9 million hours of hands-on
service, and built more than 720 places where kids and families can live. '"9'
The NBA could not repudiate fans' donations to players' causes while simul-
taneously championing its signature charitable enterprise.
Charitable donations are also unlikely to resemble a zero-sum game,
where a donation to one charity means another charity does not receive that
95 See supra Part II.A.
96 Anticipating James's 2014 free agency, Cavs fans organized several recruiting
efforts, including renting a billboard near James's old high school in Akron and
distributing t-shirts to fans and asking them to tweet photos of themselves. Dan
Favale, Cavs Fans Create 'Come Home LeBron' Campaign to Lure james Back to Cleveland,
BLEACHER REPORT (Nov. 25, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1864744-
cavs -fans -create -come-home -lebron-campaign- to -lure- james -back- to-cleveland.
97 NFL and Players' Union Donating $1 Million, SICOM (Nov. 1, 2012, 7:41 PM),
http://www.si.com/nfl/2012/1 1/01/sandy-nfl-union-donations-ap (noting donations
by the major sports leagues and players' associations to hurricane relief).
98 Overview of NBA Cares, NBA.coM, http://www.nba.com/cares/overview.html
(last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
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donation.99 For one, NBA Cares' core activities focus on team and player
charitable activities and on partnerships with other enterprises in complex
community ventures.100 For example, in 2012 NBA Cares briefly partnered
with the "Hoops 4 Hope" charity, through which customers at NBA-owned
stores could donate used sneakers in exchange for a store discount.0 1 This
charitable program certainly warrants support. But, a fan who donates
money to a player's foundation as part of free-agent recruiting is not less
likely to donate old sneakers in exchange for a store discount. For that rea-
son, FAC money for foundations favored by talent would neither diminish
nor endanger the league's civic outreach efforts.
III. FACs EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE
A. FACs Everywhere?
Our focus has been on professional team sports because that is where
money and attention are most likely to flow. Professional sports present the
most obvious trilateral relationships, and sports fans are uniquely aware of
and interested in athletes' comings and goings, providing the information
necessary to allow a FAC to form and to raise money in a recruiting effort.
Similar crowdfunding efforts might likewise succeed in other trilateral
relationships. We do not aim to exhaustively describe the extensions of the
FAC model to other areas of human activity; instead, we just sketch some
suggestions for use in other areas of commercial entertainment.
FACs are likely to succeed only where the obstacle to a deal is not the
organization's ability or willingness to pay the talent, but the talent's will-
ingness to join the organization. In those situations, FAC crowdfunding
serves not to make the talent-team relationship financially possible so much
as it serves as an expression of fan support and affection and thus a mone-
tized reason for the talent to want to join. Crowdfunding offers a supple-
mental incentive, especially when fan money is going to the talent's
preferred charitable causes. That said, we can also see how FACs might be
" See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 355 (4th Cir. 2005)
(Duncan, J., dissenting) (explaining the impact of charities competing for "the fi-
nite charitable donation dollar").
100 NBA Cares Community Partners, NBA.coM, http://www.nba.com/cares/part-
ners.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
101 Recycling Dreams, NBA.coM, http://www.nba.com/nycstore/footwear-drive
.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).
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used to completely alter the incentives of a team that was not otherwise
interested in signing a particular talent.0 2
Consider the following circumstances in which fans could, through
crowdfunding efforts, help facilitate a desired relationship between talent
and team/organization.
* Fans of the symphony or opera in one city want to help attract a
renowned conductor, violinist, or soprano from another company or
city.
* Fans of Nate Silver's statistical analysis may attempt to influence his
decision about whether to stay at the New York Times or to decamp
to ESPN. °3
* Patrons of a restaurant can help it attract or retain a celebrity chef.
* Fans of TV's "Downton Abbey" might organize and offer money to
actor Dan Stevens (who played the leading male role in the show's
first three seasons, but no longer wanted to be on the show) to con-
vince him to remain with the show.
* Fans of "The Daily Show" might collect money to convince Jon
Stewart not to take a sabbatical from the show, as he did in the
summer of 2013,'04 whether out of love for Stewart or aversion to his
replacement.
* FACs might even be used to recruit or retain academic talent, such
as legal luminaries Larry Lessig or Cass Sunstein. °5
102 See supra note 91.
103 Marc Tracy, What Nate Silver's Move Means for the 'Times' and ESPN, NEW
REPUBLIC (July 22, 2013), available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
113967/what- nate-silvers -move-means -times-and-espn. The element of fan loyalty
to the entity is arguably absent here-few readers have intense loyalty to a particu-
lar media outlet itself (certainly not loyalty comparable to a sports team) and many
Silver fans will read him whether he is at ESPN or the Times. On the other hand,
Silver would be expected to write more about sports at ESPN, so perhaps a group of
fans wanting to read more of his sports analysis would try to encourage him to
switch to a sports-oriented outlet.
104 Lauren James, Jon Stewart Returns to 'The Daily Show' After Summer Sabbatical,
CONTRACTMUSIC.COM (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.contactmusic.com/article/jon-
stewart-daily-show-return-2013_3848865.
105 This extension of the FAC model might be the most controversial of the
bunch. Unlike commercial entertainment and professional sports, the academy
might hold itself out as ungoverned by market considerations and more bound by a
set of norms appropriate to knowledge-building and dissemination. While higher
education is different from commercial entertainment in that far fewer "firms" are
motivated by profit maximization, it does not mean that academic institutions are
not substantially participating in markets to hire leading academics for their ser-
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In each of these situations, as with team sports, the money is not neces-
sary to make it financially feasible for the targeted star to join or remain
with the organization; the organization can and will pay the talent to per-
form.10 6 In fact, FACs might be more effective in these contexts than in
professional sports, because these industries do not require or encourage in-
dividual firms to be concerned with the preservation of competitive bal-
ance-there is no National Restaurant Association ensuring that each
restaurant has similar amounts to spend on chefs and a similar opportunity
to succeed. Furthermore, none of these industries or markets have rules bar-
ring coordination or cooperation between the production team and the fans
or between the talent and the fans.
FACs are valuable because they provide a mechanism for talent and
team to capture gains based on intensity of preferences. Comedy Central, for
example, makes money from "The Daily Show" through advertisements
whose pricing varies based on viewers within large demographic groups said
to be watching the show. In other words, the number of viewers matter
significantly (even exclusively) in some markets. By contrast, FACs provide
an opportunity for talent to capture gains based on the intensity of prefer-
ences belonging to particular individuals. If Bill Gates, or 50,000 individual
fans, love Stewart so much, they might be willing to use a FAC to persuade
him not to go on sabbatical. Markets must be conducive to that possible
exchange if they are to effectively engage in wealth maximization.
FACs could even extend beyond sports and commercial entertainment.
The literature on jurisdictional competition already addresses the problems
and possibilities of cities or states trying to lure businesses to site their fac-
tories in particular places."10 One could imagine how FACs and crowdfund-
ing might impact these decisions. Perhaps Seattle is trying to lure Smelly
Corp. and its 200 jobs to the area by offering $10 million in tax breaks or
other advantages. Smelly Corp. could also announce that it is amenable to
being persuaded to go somewhere else-and there is no reason a FAC (per-
vices. Charles T. Clotfelter, The Familiar but Curious Economics of Higher Education:
Introduction to a Symposium, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3 (1999).
106 If some organizations (such as the symphony seeking a violinist or a law
school seeking a cyberlaw professor) find themselves short on funds, they likely
would turn directly to their donor "fans" to fill any monetary shortage, obviating
the need for fans to work independently through a FAC. But we also imagine situa-
tions where the artistic director of a symphony or dean of a law school has interests
and priorities at odds with the fans, and the fans might be able to alter the incen-
tives through its FAC and the intensity of preferences it announces. The FAC can-
not put a gun to the artistic director's head, obviously; but crowdfunding might
affect her balance of reasons in favor or against a course of action.
107 See sources cited supra note 65.
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haps supported in part by a wealthy local) could not offer them $11 million
to go elsewhere, if the FAC supporters think Smelly Corp. is bad for Seattle.
Citizens often speak out against government efforts to attract businesses to
the area; FACs allow them to speak with their dollars."10
In sum, the use of charitable donations or direct payments by third
parties to motivate behavior is not limited to a few discrete areas of en-
deavor. Instead, it is applicable to any area where members of a committed
base are willing to express themselves financially to try to influence relevant
decision-making with respect to an organization about which they care.
FACs provide a vehicle for voluntarily reassigning one's comparative abun-
dance to achieve goals held in common with others, efforts that have failed
in the past because of a lack of coordinated organization. These means can be
used to achieve positive ends or to avoid negative ones, although we recog-
nize that what counts as positive or negative will often be in the eyes of the
beholder.
B. FACs Nowhere?
So where are the FACS, whether in team sports, commercial entertain-
ment, or elsewhere? As the old economics joke goes, if a ten-dollar bill is
lying on the ground, then it must not really exist because someone would
have picked it up already.1" 9 Perhaps FACs are the equivalent of that ten-
dollar bill. As with any innovation, sometimes ingenuity happens, which
explains why demand for some products is higher than it is for others.
Crowdfunding itself has existed for only about five years and its parameters
and potential applications are still being discovered. Even so, we have seen a
few small-scale efforts in this direction, especially in connection with team
sports. 110
108 FACs might even enter slightly more peculiar markets, such as offering
money, directly or to charity, to encourage a public official (Supreme Court Justice,
congressman, cabinet official) to step down. Our sense is that federal ethics rules
would make this an impermissible quid pro quo, even if one might view the retire-
ment from office as more like a cessation of official action than an official action
itself. Cf Ross E. Davies, The Judiciary Fund: A Modest Proposal that the Bar Give to
Judges What Congress Will Not Let Them Earn, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 354 (2008) (argu-
ing that the organized bar can collectively provide financial support for un-
derfunded judges and judiciary); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
387 (1998) (arguing that check-off boxes on tax returns can be used as a polling
measure to gauge intensity of preferences with respect to contested policies).
109 See, e.g., ROGER A. ARNOLD, ECONOMICS 472 (8th ed. 2008).
110 See Favale, supra note 96; WQAM, supra note 23.
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As much as we would like to believe the absence of ingenuity is the
reason for the current absence of FACs, we must be open to other
explanations.
1. Coordination Costs
One possibility is that FACs require coordination across a number of
actors-talent, agents, teams, leagues, along with the fans who organize and
participate in the crowdfunding efforts. These coordination costs are high.
This highlights a more general commercial problem-consumers' voices are
often not heard clearly or correctly. Even taking into account the pervasive-
ness of marketing research through focus groups, the intense preferences of
some viewers might be economically relevant when deciding whether to
cancel a television show or trade a popular player. 11 FACs can respond to
this problem; in some ways, fans become more like spectators in a Roman
arena, where the pitch and yaw of the crowd's mood had an intensely mean-
ingful impact on the gladiators' well-being.
2. Information Hurdles
There are information costs as well. The public knew that LeBron
James was a free agent (twice) who wanted to take his talents elsewhere-
this is the main reason team sports are the most obvious context for initial
FAC efforts. The public may be less aware that Maria Callas is looking for a
new opera home or that Jon Stewart is thinking of taking a hiatus from his
show. For FACs to work, there must be a way for stars to credibly signal
that they are interested in being wooed by another entity so that the recruit-
ing entity does not feel that it is wasting too much of its agents' time. That
signal from the talent must reach fans who will undertake their own fun-
draising efforts.
3. Social Norms
A third variable includes the stickiness of social norms. As discussed
earlier, FACs do not raise plausible claims of tortious interference with con-
tract. But, the penumbra of that tort shades social norms surrounding the
supposed sanctity of privity in contract and social inertia against tampering
111 Of course, had the show been more popular-that is, had more fans watched
the show-it likely would not have been canceled. But that show might be valuable
to a few very devoted watchers and the intensity of their preferences might matter
to the show's producers if there's a way of monetizing them.
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with contractual relationships. There also remains the awkwardness of ordi-
nary fans spending money to benefit or influence wealthy stars and teams.1 2
These social norms might impede the emergence of FACs.
One way to overcome that inertia is to organize FACs in a way that
incentivizes entrepreneurs to surmount those hurdles. A FAC might absorb
a small percentage of the money that is raised to cover administrative costs
and furnish some profit or financial return for the person spearheading the
effort. Moreover, online crowdsourcing platforms lower the costs of these
efforts, much as technology has facilitated the lowering of costs associated
with increasingly standardized legal instruments."13
CONCLUSION
Fans currently do not financially direct or even influence where stars
choose to perform; fans instead are left to scream about it from the sidelines.
They deserve better. The same people who devote mental and emotional
energy and passion for talent and teams also spend their hard-earned salaries
buying tickets and knick-knacks. This makes them stakeholders in the vari-
ous choices made by talent. By harnessing imagination, resources, and en-
ergy, FACs are a catalyst for the realization of fan power.
FACs are not the only way to bring fans into the decision-making mix.
Teams could be capitalized and directed through publicly traded stocks
under affiliated rules of corporate governance; alternatively, they could be
organized as community cooperatives. Those structures would also empower
fans, although we leave the merits of such competing models for another
day.
In our view, whether enriching stars through direct payments or facili-
tating contributions to charitable causes, FACs are permissible and easily
created. While their existence might impose some costs, FACs should spur
some important conversations about professional entertainment and sports,
and what we expect from these fields of endeavor and why. Finally, when
structured under the charitable model, FACs can incidentally lead to im-
112 This criticism has been levied at several well-known artists who have under-
taken crowdfunding efforts despite personally possessing sufficient money to make
their projects happen. See Kathryn Shattuck, The Roar Over the Funds of the Crowd,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/movies/the-roar-
over- the-funds -of- the-crowd.html (discussing criticism of Hollywood star using
Kickstarter to fund movie).
113 See, e.g., LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2014)
(providing low cost options for wills, family law, incorporation of LLCs, trademarks,
and other areas of "mass" or store-front law).
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proved access to medicine and the arts and the alleviation of other social
inequalities, all while helping the local team win. FACs, in short, offer
promise to a vision that empowers fans, greases commerce, directs money to
charities, and, in so doing, very likely effects positive social change.
